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Abstract 
“Twenty thousand service members experience sexual assault every year” while “only a 
tiny fraction of those end up with any kind of action at all in the military justice system.” Lynn 
Rosenthal, director of the DoD Independent Review Commission, recently offered this 
observation at a press conference while summarizing the findings reflected in the commission’s 
report. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand indicated in a recent blog post that “an estimated 20,500 
service members are sexually assaulted every year” to make the case that there “is an epidemic 
of sexual assault in the military and the current military justice system has proven incapable of 
addressing it.” Likewise, General Mark Milley, currently the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, recently observed, “If we had 20,000 casualties in Afghanistan last year or 20,000 
casualties in Iraq, we'd be taking some pretty radical actions to correct that.” 
 The assertion that an estimated 20,000 U.S. military service members are sexually 
assaulted each year has become a common refrain in contemporary discourse. Indeed, the 
estimated prevalence data have long been at the center of the movement to divest commanders of 
the authority to initiate criminal charges and refer offenses to court-martial. Whence is this 
estimate of 20,000 annual sexual assaults drawn, and how effective is it as a measure of the 
performance of the commander-centric U.S. military justice system?  
 This essay conducts a detailed assessment of the claim that an estimated 20,000 service 
members are sexually assaulted each year. The source of the assertion, a biennial survey that was 
last conducted by the DoD Office of People Analytics in 2018, is identified along with prior 
iterations of the survey. With the source identified, the essay examines several limitations that 
support the conclusions that the “estimate” is not an accurate approximation for actual sexual 
assault offenses and that these central prevalence data are not an effective measure of the 
performance of the U.S. military justice system. After examining these factors in detail, the essay 
concludes by considering the landscape of the debate regarding commander disposition authority 




Special advisory statement:  
 
 This essay engages with and describes content that readers who have experienced sexual 
trauma may find to be distressing. While specific details regarding experiences of sexual trauma 
are not described, certain aspects of sexual assault crimes are described in detail. This is 
particularly the case on pages 8 to 11 of the essay, which describe factors involved with the 
crimes of rape, sexual assault, and abusive sexual contact. If you have, or if someone close to 
you has, experienced such offenses, some material in the essay may be distressing for you. 
 As someone who has personally experienced sexual assault while in the military, I can 
directly relate to some of the challenges associated with engaging with material of this nature. 
My own experience occurred soon after arriving at my first duty assignment – 3/504 PIR, 82nd 
Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina – in August 1996. Based on the particular 
circumstances of my own experience, I was and have been able to cope well and move on 
afterward. I recognize that not everyone who has experienced sexual trauma is able to do so. For 
some readers who have experienced sexual trauma, developing a support plan prior to reading 
this essay may be advisable. 
 Another aspect of this essay that a reader who has experienced sexual trauma, particularly 
in the military context, may find distressing is that the analysis challenges a central mode of 
discourse that has emerged involving sexual assault in the military. In this essay, I directly 
challenge the manner in which prevalence estimates have been used to describe an “epidemic of 
rape and sexual assault” that ostensibly has long beset the U.S. military and that the commander-
centric military justice system has been unable to alleviate. In challenging the use of prevalence 
data that has long formed the basis of this characterization, I do not intend to suggest that sexual 
assault does not occur in the military or that there is no room for the military to improve in 
relation to the prevention of and response to sexual assault. 
 I stand together, shoulder to shoulder, with those who have experienced sexual assault in 
the military and with those who demand improved performance in relation to the prevention of 
and response to military sexual trauma. As a retired service member and former military 
prosecutor, part of what that commitment means for me is achieving a more informed 
understanding of the exact nature of the problem that needs to be addressed. Only in this way 
will we be able to identify, develop, and implement measures that will be truly effective. This is 
an enduring personal effort, even though the specific subject matter of this essay is limited to the 
manner in which prevalence data have been used as a measure of the effectiveness of the military 
justice system. Challenging the manner in which prevalence data have been utilized, though, is 
not intended to suggest that sexual assault does not occur in the military or that there is nothing 
that needs to be done to improve performance related to the prevention of and response to sexual 
assault in the military. 
 
A Detailed Assessment of the Sexual Assault Prevalence Statistics at the Center of the 
Military Justice Reform Movement 
 
by Brian L. Cox* 
 
Initial reflections 
The current session of Congress has ushered in a number of significant developments in the 
long-running debate involving the role of the military commander in deciding whether to adjudicate 
alleged offenses related to sexual assault. For the first time, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand reports that a 
bill1 she and a number of co-sponsors have introduced in the Senate currently has a “filibuster-proof 
majority.”2 In a related development, Lloyd Austin is the first Secretary of Defense to endorse a 
measure that would divest commanders of disposition authority for sexual assault and “related 
crimes” such as domestic violence,3 and President Joe Biden has since adopted Secretary Austin’s 
recommendation.4 The endorsements by Secretary Austin and President Biden follow a report 
published by the DoD Independent Review Commission (IRC), which is the first official report to 
recommend divesting disposition authority from commanders – at least for alleged sexual assault 
and related offenses.5 
 
* © 2021. Adjunct professor of law and matriculating J.S.D. candidate, Cornell Law School; visiting scholar, 
Queen’s Law in Ontario. In 2018, Prof. Cox retired from the U.S. Army after 22 years of military service. While in 
the military, Prof. Cox served as an airborne infantry soldier, combat camera operator, airborne infantry officer, and 
for seven years as an Army judge advocate. His combat deployments include Iraq from 2003-2004 as a combat 
camera operator and Afghanistan from 2013-2014 as an operational law advisor and then chief of international and 
operational law for Regional Command-East. Prof. Cox also served as a military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, 
brigade judge advocate, administrative law attorney, legal assistance attorney, and military magistrate while he was 
a judge advocate. As an Army judge advocate, Prof. Cox completed the Special Victims Unit Investigations Course 
at the U.S. Army Military Police School as well as the Intermediate Trial Advocacy Course and the Brigade 
Leader’s Course at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, among other professional 
certification courses. 
 
1 Military Justice Improvement and Increasing Prevention Act of 2021, S. 1520, 117th Cong. (2021), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1520. 
2 See Jordain Carney, Democrats Wage High-profile Fight Over Military Sexual Assault, THE HILL (June 2, 2021), 
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/556390-democrats-wage-high-profile-fight-over-military-sexual-assault (reporting 
that Gillibrand has indicated that supporters “have a bipartisan, filibuster-proof majority backing this bill”). 
3 See Memorandum, Sec’y Def., Department of Defense Actions and Implementation Guidance to Address Sexual 
Assault and Sexual Harassment in the Military (July 2, 2021), 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Independent-Review-Commission-on-Sexual-Assault-in-the-Military. 
4 See Press Release, Statement of President Joe Biden on the Results of the Independent Review Commission on 
Military Sexual Assault (July 2, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/07/02/statement-of-president-joe-biden-on-the-results-of-the-independent-review-commission-on-
military-sexual-assault. 
5 See HARD TRUTHS AND THE DUTY TO CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW 
COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY (2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/02/2002755437/-1/-
1/0/irc-full-report-final-1923-7-1-21.pdf/irc-full-report-final-1923-7-1-21.pdf. 
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The merits of the proposed measure to divest commanders of disposition authority for 
allegations of sexual misconduct have been debated at length over the years.6 While I have my own 
views involving the merits of the measure based on my experience as a (now retired) Army judge 
advocate, the goal of the present essay is not to debate the merits. Nor is my intent here to conduct 
a critical assessment of the IRC report that persuaded Secretary Austin and President Biden to 
endorse the recommendation to shift disposition authority to military lawyers for certain offenses – 
though I am currently engaged in a detailed study of the report. 
My intent with this essay is to examine an aspect of the debate that has thus far not been 
explored in great detail in prior scholarship on the topic. At the very core of the debate involving 
disposition authority for commanders is that the military has for too long experienced what is 
described as an “epidemic of rape and sexual assault” that has not been alleviated by prior measures 
to improve the problem. This essay conducts an in-depth assessment of the prevalence statistics that 
form the basis of the characterization that the military has long experienced an epidemic of rape and 
sexual assault.  
As lawmakers get set to revise and debate the legislation that is currently pending in both 
chambers, enhanced clarity involving the precise problem they are seeking to address is vitally 
important in making informed decisions. To lend structure to the present examination, the analysis 
seeks to answer two central questions: 1) How accurate are the central prevalence statistics as a 
measure of actual sexual assault offenses?; and 2) What do the central prevalence statistics reveal 
about the performance of the military justice system when applied to the number of cases referred 
by commanders to court-martial each year? 
As the analysis below reveals, the central prevalence statistics do not present an accurate 
approximation for the actual number of sexual assault offenses in the military each year, and, 
 
6 See, e.g., Rachel VanLandingham, Professional Criminal Prosecution Versus the Siren Song of Command: The 
Road to Improve Military Justice, JUST SECURITY (June 21, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/77025/professional-
criminal-prosecution-versus-the-siren-song-of-command-the-road-to-improve-military-justice; Charlie Dunlap, 
Don’t Hobble the Military Justice Authority and Responsibility of America’s Commanders, LAWFIRE (June 1, 2021), 
https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2021/06/01/dont-hobble-the-military-justice-authority-and-responsibility-of-americas-
commanders; Geoffrey S. Corn, Chris Jenks & Timothy C. MacDonnell, A Solution in Search of a Problem: The 
Dangerous Invalidity of Divesting Military Commanders of Disposition Authority for Military Criminal Offenses, 
JUST SECURITY (June 29, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71111/introducing-an-open-letter-from-former-u-s-
military-commanders-judge-advocates-commander-authority-to-administer-the-ucmj; Eugene R. Fidell, Military 
Justice Reform, the 2020 Pledge, and the President’s Power, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/68672/military-justice-reform-the-2020-pledge-and-the-presidents-power; Jordan 




partially as a result, the numbers reveal very little about the current performance of the commander-
centric system of disposition authority. The analysis begins by putting the prevalence statistics in 
context before closely examining the source of the statistics. 
 
Describing the Context for the Central Prevalence Statistics 
 
Senator Gillibrand summarizes well in a recent blog post the central prevalence statistics that 
form the core of her long-running drive to divest commanders of court-martial convening 
authority.7 She begins the post by asserting that there “is an epidemic of sexual assault in the military 
and the current military justice system has proven incapable of addressing it.” In support of this 
assertion, Senator Gillibrand notes that “an estimated 20,500 service members are sexually assaulted 
every year, but last year, fewer than 6,300 of those service members reported their assaults.” To 
apply the prevalence statistics to the performance of the military justice system, Senator Gillibrand 
notes that “less than one in ten of the cases considered are sent to trial, and just a small fraction of 
those cases end in conviction.”  
The solution to this problem, according to Senator Gillibrand, is “to change who is 
responsible for handling these cases” since “commanders are also not trained lawyers.” Senator 
Gillibrand makes the case that even though military commanders say they have the solutions, by her 
estimation they “don’t have it” because “by nearly every measure things are moving in the wrong 
direction.” Senator Gillibrand concludes the post by asserting that the draft legislation should be 
adopted because it “would help us deliver on our national promise of justice for all.” 
Senator Gillibrand makes several points in the post that warrant further scrutiny, but the 
focus of this essay is the very first thread in the tapestry she describes in support of the measure. 
That is, that the military experiences an “epidemic of sexual assault” since an “estimated 20,500 
service members are sexually assaulted each year.” With a current total active-duty end strength of 
just over 1.3 million service members,8 a condition by which over 1.5% of the force is sexually 
assaulted each year would certainly qualify as an epidemic in need of drastic measures to correct.  
 
7 See Kirsten Gillibrand, Sen. Gillibrand: Voters Want Lawyers — Not Commanders — To Prosecute Sexual Assault 
In The Military, DATA FOR PROGRESS (July 12, 2021), https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2021/7/12/voters-want-
lawyers-not-commanders-prosecuting-sexual-assault. 
8 Dep’t Def., Armed Forces Strength Figures for May 31, 2021 (pdf download), 
https://dwp.dmdc.osd.mil/dwp/api/download?fileName=ms0_2105.pdf&groupName=milTop. 
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This estimate that around 20,000 service members experience sexual assault each year has 
become a staple in discourse involving the role of the commander in deciding whether to adjudicate 
alleged sexual assault offenses. A current page on Senator Tammy Baldwin’s website, for example, 
claims that “almost 21,000 service members were sexually assaulted in 2018 despite repeated efforts 
to end [the] scourge of sexual harassment and assault in the military.”9 Representative Jackie Speier, 
a long-time advocate of the proposed change, recently opened a press conference in support of the 
House version of the draft legislation by asserting, “We’re here today because each year 20,000 
service members are sexually assaulted.”10  
Lynn Rosenthal, director of the DoD Independent Review Commission, asserted in a recent 
Pentagon briefing at which she announced the IRC recommendations that “twenty thousand service 
members experience sexual assault every year” while “only a tiny fraction of those end up with any 
kind of action at all in the military justice system.”11 Likewise, a recent video op-ed posted by The 
New York Times flashes the number “20,500” on the screen to accompany an explanation by 
Colonel (ret.) Don Christensen, president of the advocacy group Protect Our Defenders, claiming 
that “thousands of service members report being raped or sexually assaulted each year, but only a 
fraction of those cases (the screen now displays the number 0.5%) result in a conviction.”12 
Similarly, a recent news report observes that a DoD biennial survey “found that more than 20,000 
service members said they experienced some type of sexual assault, but only a third of those filed a 
formal report.”13 
What was accurately described by Senator Gillibrand as an estimate of 20,000 sexual assaults 
in the military each year, then, is often treated in discourse as an actual number of sexual assaults. 
When it is treated as an actual number of offenses, the outcome can be quite startling indeed. As 
what is described by Protect Our Defenders as a “fact sheet” from 2015 points out, “the sexual 
 
9 Press Release, Tammy Baldwin, Senator Baldwin Supports the of New, Bipartisan Military Justice Improvement 
And Increasing Prevention Act (April 30, 2021), https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/military-justice-
improvement-and-increasing-prevention-act-2021. 
10 See Kennedy Sessions, Lawmakers Introduce the Vanessa Guillen Act into Congress, TEXAS SIGNAL (June 24, 
2021), https://texassignal.com/lawmakers-introduce-the-vanessa-guillen-act-into-congress. 
11 See Dep’t Def., Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing (July 2, 2021), 
https://www.defense.gov/newsroom/transcripts/transcript/article/2681883/pentagon-press-secretary-john-f-kirby-
holds-a-press-briefing.  
12 Joni Ernst, Don Christensen & Mei-Ling Jerez, There’s a Sexual Assault Crisis in the Military. Congress Can 
Stop It, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000007737321/sexual-assault-
military-ernst-gillibrand.html. 
13 Robert Burns, Top General Drops Opposition to Change in Sex Assault Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 3, 
2021), https://apnews.com/article/government-and-politics-e343b149e17bfa5cc104ea354bdf8065. 
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assault rate remains the same as 2010.”14 If this estimate of about 20,000 actual offenses each year 
dating back to at least 2010 is accurate, it is quite reasonable to conclude that no previous measures 
have been effective at alleviating the “epidemic” of sexual assault. 
With such an apparently shocking and long-running statistical prevalence of sexual assault in 
the military, it is of vital importance to fully understand how this statistic is derived and what it 
suggests about the effort to prevent and respond to sexual assault in the military. The following 
sections explore the central prevalence statistics in detail. The essay then concludes with some 
reflections on the way ahead regarding the present debate with the sexual assault prevalence statistics 
situated in proper context. 
 
Methodological Observations Relevant to the WGRA Prevalence Estimate 
 
In short, the suggestion that approximately 20,000 sexual assaults occur in the military 
annually is drawn from a report that analyzes responses to a biennial survey that is currently 
administered by the DoD Office of People Analytics. Though the report has been known by other 
names in the past, the current nomenclature for the report is Workplace and Gender Relations 
Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA). The most recent WGRA report, which analyzes the 2018 
version of the biennial survey, estimates that 12,927 women and 7,546 men reportedly experienced a 
sexual assault in the past 12 months.15 This estimated sum is 20,473 – or about 20,500.  
By way of comparison, the total estimated number of military personnel who reported 
experiencing sexual assault in the previous 12 months for the 2016 version of the survey is 14,881.16 
The best estimate for the 2014 version of the survey is 20,000.17 As the 2016 WGRA report notes, 
comparing specific “trends prior to 2014 [is] not possible due to measurement differences.”18  
On the topic of comparisons, the 2018 report indicates that “survey methodology used on 
WGR surveys has remained largely consistent across time, which allows for comparisons across 
 
14 Protect Our Defenders, Debunking Claims of Progress on Military Sexual Assault (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.protectourdefenders.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Debunking-Claims-of-Progress.png. 
15 OFF. PEOPLE ANALYTICS, DEP’T DEF., 2018 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY 
MEMBERS OVERVIEW REPORT 26 (May 2019), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ad1071721.pdf [hereinafter 2018 WGRA 
Overview Report]. 
16 OFF. PEOPLE ANALYTICS, DEP’T DEF., 2016 WORKPLACE AND GENDER RELATIONS SURVEY OF ACTIVE DUTY 
MEMBERS OVERVIEW REPORT 32 (May 2017), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ad1032638.pdf. 
17 NAT’L DEF. RSCH. INST., RAND CORP., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. MILITARY: TOP-
LINE ESTIMATES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY SERVICE MEMBERS FROM THE 2014 RAND MILITARY WORKPLACE STUDY 9 
(2014), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/rr800/rr870/rand_RR870.pdf. 
18 2016 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 16 at ix. 
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survey administrations.”19 These two separate methodological observations suggest that the reports 
from 2014, 2016, and 2018 allow for fairly useful specific trend comparisons, while reports prior to 
this are decidedly less useful as a comparison set for current trends. With the estimated prevalence 
statistics bracketed in this manner, then, the top-line prevalence estimates for 2014, 2016, and 2018 
is 20,000, 14,900, and 20,500, respectively.  
 
Identifying the WGRA Survey Population 
 
With these reflections on similar methodology and the comparative trend in focus, how are 
these estimates derived, and what are some of the limitations inherent in relying on the estimates as 
a primary justification for major policy reform? For ease of reference, the present analysis focuses 
primarily on the methodology for the 2018 WGRA survey – though there are some marginal 
methodological divergences that have been incorporated as the survey administrators have fine-
tuned the process over time.20 
The first point of interest to note regarding the 2018 WGRA survey is that out of a total 
eligible population of 1,285,990 active-duty DoD servicemembers in the paygrades of E1 to O6, the 
sample size of the survey – the amount of the eligible population to which the voluntary survey is 
made available – was 694,441 servicemembers.21 This sample size amounts to 54% of the eligible 
active-duty DoD population. Out of this sample of potential participants, responses were received 
from 102,109 service members. Because the response rate is adjusted slightly in an attempt to 
mitigate the effects of a statistical bias that can be introduced when members of smaller population 
categories in the sample set decline to participate in the survey, the response rate is weighted using a 
formula that is summarized in a graph presented in the report.22 
In any event, the survey report adjusts the “raw” response rate from 14.7% (102,109 divided 
by 694,441) to a total weighted response rate of 17%. This adjustment means the total weighted 
number of responses, for purposes of the survey, is 118,055 rather than the actual number of 
responses – 102,109. Nonetheless, even with this higher weighted number of responses, the total 
(weighted) response rate if the number of responses is applied to the entire eligible active-duty DoD 
population is just 9%, while the unweighted response rate when applied to the entire eligible 
 
19 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 15. 
20 See id. at 5. 
21 Id. at 19. 
22 See id. (Figure 10). 
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population is slightly lower, at 7.9%. Because the variance between the two rates is minimal and the 
survey findings are based on the weighted response rate, the present analysis adopts the higher 
response rate of 9%, when applied to the total eligible population, as well.  
It is of course common practice for survey reports to extrapolate statistical analyzes and 
present generalized findings that apply to an entire population based on responses that are received 
from a small fraction of the measured population. However, any such study must account for and 
try to mitigate the effects of statistical bias, or any factor “that leads to a systematic difference 
between the true parameters of a population and the statistics used to estimate those parameters.”23 
Any existing bias that is introduced will propagate throughout the statistical calculations as the 
findings from the response set are extrapolated to apply to the entire population set.24  
At a total (weighted) response rate of only 9% when applied to the total eligible population, 
the possible effect of propagation error introduced from any potential statistical bias can be quite 
significant. The relatively low response rate is a limiting factor the report authors acknowledge and 
suggest that OPA is “undertaking a number of efforts to improve the gradually declining response 
rates” for the survey.25 Thankfully, the WGRA developers go to impressive lengths to try to mitigate 
the effect of statistical bias that is introduced into the sample and that propagates throughout the 
results.  
As the next three sections detail, there are several factors that lead the report authors to 
caution that the WGRA results do not present an estimate of the prevalence of actual sexual assault 
offenses. These noted limitations certainly do not impugn the findings of the WGRA report. 
However, the inherent limitations do have significant implications for the accuracy of the estimate as 
a measure of actual prevalence and for the usefulness of the prevalence statistics derived from the 
report as a measure of effectiveness upon which to base justifications for major policy reforms. 
 
WGRA Report Limitation: “Behaviors Endorsed By Respondents’ Self-Reports” 
 
The first relevant central limitation acknowledged by the authors of the WGRA report 
involves the challenge of equating the perception of events conveyed by survey respondents with 
 
23 Jenny Gutbezahl, 5 Types of Statistical Bias to Avoid in Your Analyses, BUSINESS INSIGHTS (June 13, 2017), 
https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/types-of-statistical-bias. 
24 For a useful overview of the concept of statistical error propagation, see Stephanie Glen, Error Propagation 
(Propagation of Uncertainty), STATISTICSHOWTO.COM, https://www.statisticshowto.com/error-propagation (last 
visited July 10, 2021). 
25 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 19. 
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experiencing verifiable criminal conduct. The WGRA addresses this limitation by affirming that “all 
references to ‘experiences’ of sexual assault … are based on behaviors endorsed by respondents’ 
self-reports.” As such, references to “‘sexual assault’… throughout the report do not imply legal 
definitions.”26 
When this limitation is read in conjunction with the estimate that 12,927 women and 7,546 
men “experienced a sexual assault in the past 12 months,” the caveat that this reference to sexual 
assault does not imply a legal definition constitutes a significant constraint on the usefulness of this 
measure as an account of actual incidents of sexual assault in the military. The likelihood that 
deliberately untruthful survey responses are a factor that could represent a substantial risk of 
statistical bias is of course minimal, especially in the context of an anonymous survey. However, the 
fact that the survey relies solely on “behaviors endorsed by respondents’ self-reports” to generate 
statistical data does indicate that the survey results do not present a valid approximation of actual 
offenses related to sexual assault.  
This is so primarily because of the expansive nature of conduct that is defined as “sexual 
assault” in the military context. An affirmative response indicating that the respondent experienced a 
penetrative sexual assault in the past year, for example, includes conduct equating to rape pursuant 
to Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the alleged offender “used, or threatened to 
use, physical force to make you comply”). However, an affirmative response also can indicate that 
the penetrative sexual act occurred while the respondent was “so drunk, high, or drugged that you 
could not understand what was happening or could not show them that you were willing.”  
This conduct equates to one variety of sexual assault (as opposed to rape) pursuant to Article 
120 of the UCMJ. For the former category of sexual misconduct, rape, it is unlikely that an 
affirmative response on the survey could involve a difference of perceptions as between an alleged 
perpetrator and a survey respondent. For the latter category, however, the potentially competing 
perspectives of the participants matters a great deal.  
The particular aspect of the crime of the relevant version of sexual assault requires that the 
victim was incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to impairment and that this “condition is 
known or reasonably should be known by the” alleged offender.27 An affirmative response on the 
survey accounts for the first aspect of the crime, but not the second. This is to be expected since the 
 
26 Id. at 1. 
27 See 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(3) (Article 120(b)(3) of the UCMJ) (available at 
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:10%20section:920%20edition:prelim). 
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WGRA report is scoped to analyze “behaviors endorsed by the respondents’ self-reports” and 
references to sexual assault “do not imply legal definitions.” The potential divergence between 
perception and genuinely criminal conduct in this context introduces a significant risk of statistical 
bias as the number of affirmative responses is extrapolated to represent the entire eligible 
population. 
To that end, the confluence of several other factors inherent in the WGRA responses tends 
to accentuate the risk of statistical bias. While approximately 58% of the estimated number of 
respondents who reported experiencing sexual assault were women (estimated 12,927 women 
compared to estimated 7,546 men), an estimated nearly half (49%) of affirmative responses by 
women indicated that a penetrative assault was the most serious behavior they experienced.28 
Regarding alcohol use, 49% of women who are estimated to have indicated that they experienced 
sexual assault also answered that the victim was drinking at the time, while 62% indicated that the 
respondent and/or the alleged offender were drinking alcohol during the event.29 
With women constituting over half of the estimated affirmative responses indicating an 
experience of sexual assault, and nearly half of these being a penetrative sexual assault, and half or 
more of all affirmative responses of sexual assault by women involving alcohol consumption, the 
risk is substantial that the divergence between perception of sexual assault and the crime of sexual 
assault introduces a statistically significant element of bias. Because the total (weighted) response 
rate for the survey is only 9% of the eligible active-duty population, this already statistically 
significant risk of bias propagates drastically throughout the calculated survey results as the number 
of affirmative survey responses is adjusted to estimate the prevalence among the entire eligible 
population. 
Lest it seem rather implausible to suggest that such an appreciable gap may exist between 
perceptions of crime and actual crime, it may be useful to consider that “military training aimed at 
preventing sexual harassment and assault” has suggested for years that being “barely tipsy” makes a 
person incapable of consenting to sex.30 This is, of course, a gross mischaracterization of the actual 
 
28 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 30. 
29 Id. at 33. 
30 Nancy Montgomery, US Military Court Addresses 'Incapable of Consent' to Sex Issue, STARS AND STRIPES (May 
17, 2016), https://www.stripes.com/news/us-military-court-addresses-incapable-of-consent-to-sex-issue-1.409974. It 
should be noted that this report does not constitute official DoD guidance. Though anecdotal, my own experience 
with receiving sexual assault prevention and response training during the course of my military career is consistent 
with this observation, and I assess that many servicemembers would endorse a similar experience. Partially as a 
result of this misinformation that is (or, at least used to be) communicated during standard prevention and response 
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legal standard. Military training involving the prevention of sexual assault has long been recognized 
in the ranks as inadequate,31 and recent efforts have focused on improving this deficiency.32  
Nonetheless, current shortcomings in military sexual assault response and prevention 
training generate a significant degree of confusion regarding what sexual assault is – and as 
importantly – is not. Even absent this confusion, cases involving an allegation that the defendant 
engaged in sexual activity with a person who was incapable of consenting due to alcohol intoxication 
are among the most difficult alleged offenses for a trier of fact to adjudicate.33 As mentioned above, 
this is because a guilty verdict requires a finding, to a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the alleged assailant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was incapable of 
consenting – and such a finding often turns on circumstantial evidence and evaluating competing 
perceptions.   
One recent study of sexual assault in the military summarizes some of the challenges with 
perceptions in such cases by describing that a “person who consumes alcohol to a blacked-out state 
may not remember how much alcohol they consumed or they may engage in conduct that could 
cause another to reasonably believe consent exists for sexual intercourse, and afterwards he or she 
would have no recollection of their conduct.”34 Given that a separate report examining the same 
time period as the 2018 WGRA survey estimated that more than a third of service members were 
current binge drinkers35 and found that “risky sexual behavior among service members was not 
uncommon,”36 it is certainly possible that a connection between alcohol and sexual behavior has an 
effect on “behaviors endorsed by respondents’ self-reports,” which the WGRA report analyzes. This 
 
training, I developed my own customized prevention and response training to present to the soldiers in my unit when 
I served as a brigade judge advocate just prior to retiring from the military. 
31 See, e.g., Haley Britzky, This Army Unit Will Now Immediately Start Separating Soldiers Found Guilty of Assault 
or Harassment, TASK AND PURPOSE (May 10, 2021), https://taskandpurpose.com/news/18th-airborne-corps-sexual-
harassment-assault (reporting on efforts to improve prevention and response training and concluding with a quote 
from a soldier who indicated, “I’m just saying what I feel and what I know so many other people feel … like, the 
SHARP [sexual harassment and assault response and prevention] training is not effective”). 
32 See Sarah Blake Morgan, US Army Crowdsources Ideas to Combat Sexual Assault Crisis, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Feb. 26, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/army-crowdsource-combat-sexual-assault-
4b622cb4c2e842ffd8d074ec932edf83. 
33 See, e.g., U.S. v. Pease, NMCCA 201400165 (Navy & Marine Corps Crim. App. July 14, 2015) (available at 
https://www.jag.navy.mil/courts/documents/archive/2015/pease-201400165-pub.pdf), aff’d, C.A.A.F. No. 16-0014 
(Mar. 17, 2016) (available at https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/opinions/2015SepTerm/160014.pdf). 
34 David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, National, Military, and College Reports on Prosecution of Sexual 
Assaults and Victims’ Rights: Is the Military Actually Safer than Civilian Society?, 56 GONZ. L.R. 285, 345 (2021). 
35 SARAH O. MEADOWS ET AL., 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEALTH RELATED BEHAVIORS SURVEY (HRBS): 
RESULTS FOR THE ACTIVE COMPONENT, RAND CORP. 204 (2021), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr4222.html.  
36 Id. at 207. 
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finding is consistent with the WGRA report, which, as mentioned above, identifies a significant 
connection between alcohol use and what the survey describes as an “unwanted [sexual] event.”37 
In short, the incredible degree of nuance associated with sexual conduct for which alcohol is 
a factor means that there may be a considerable gap between perceptions of an assault and the crime 
of assault for certain types of sexual assault that can be difficult to account for in a statistical analysis 
of survey responses. The same is true for the non-penetrative offense of abusive sexual contact, 
incidentally, which requires a finding that the alleged offender touched another person on a 
“private” part (to summarize the list of body parts) with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or 
degrade the victim or to do so for the purpose of sexual gratification. Though alcohol is not 
necessarily as much of a factor in parsing perception from offense for abusive sexual contact as it 
can be for the offense of sexual assault when alcohol is involved in the latter, both of these types of 
offenses involve a significant degree of perception that is difficult to account for on a survey that 
measures experiences of sexual assault that are based on behaviors endorsed by respondents’ self-
reports.  
The resultant significant risk of statistical bias that propagates as the number of affirmative 
survey responses is expanded to generate an estimate of prevalence across the entire eligible survey 
population, of course, does not impugn the findings of the WGRA findings. The validity of the 
findings is not impugned because the report affirms that “all references to ‘experiences’ of sexual 
assault … are based on behaviors endorsed by respondents’ self-reports” and that references to 
“‘sexual assault’… throughout the report do not imply legal definitions.”38 However, relying on 
“behaviors endorsed by respondents’ self-reports” without being able to develop additional 
information regarding the self-reports does substantially limit the usefulness of the prevalence 
statistics reflected therein as a measure of the effectiveness of the military justice system to 
adjudicate crimes of sexual assault. 
 
WGRA Report Limitation: “Unique Military Context” 
 
A second central limitation in the prevalence statistics presented in the WGRA report 
involves what the authors describe as the “unique military context” that may set the findings apart 
from other studies that address a non-military setting. As the authors of the WGRA report note, 
 
37 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 33. 
38 Id. at 1. 
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such “differences may manifest in terms of both victimization and perpetration.”39 According to the 
authors, this characteristic “motivates the need to collect data specific to the military population 
regarding not only the prevalence of sexual assault but also the characteristics of these incidents, 
including the individual, social, organizational, or environmental factors that may prevent or support 
them.”40 
Among these latter noted aspects, the “organizational” factor of the “unique military 
context” involved in the WGRA report is particularly prone to the prospect of introducing statistical 
bias that can be propagated as the survey responses are expanded to derive an estimated prevalence 
from among the entire eligible population. To that end, a recently published study41 examining the 
2018 WGRA results suggests that “sexual assault risk is associated with individual characteristics of 
members of the military and aspects of military service, such as service branch, occupation, and unit 
characteristics.”42 A similar finding from this recent report likewise suggests that “lower 
sociocultural and organizational power are associated with increased likelihood of experiencing 
assault.”43 
The inability of the WGRA report to incorporate a mechanism to account for the “unique 
military context” such as “individual, social, organizational, or environmental factors” introduces yet 
another potential source of statistical bias. Yet again, this limitation does not necessarily impugn the 
findings of the WGRA report since it does not purport to present an accurate estimate of the 
prevalence of actual sexual assault offenses. However, the risk for propagation of statistical bias does 
exist since the survey doesn’t account for such “unique military context” when the survey responses 
are expanded to provide an estimate of prevalence from among the entire eligible military 
population. This limitation indicates that the WGRA report is not a particularly accurate measure for 





39 Id. at 25. 
40 Id. 
41 For a useful overview of the report, see Jennifer Steinhauer, A New Report Shows that the Risk of Sexual Assault 
for Women in the Army Is Highest at Fort Hood, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/18/us/politics/military-sexual-assault.html 
42   MIRIAM MATTHEWS ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH RISK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE U.S. ARMY, RAND CORP. 3 (2021), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rra1013-1.html. 
43 Id. at 4. 
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WGRA Report Limitation: Non-Response Bias 
 
A final potential limitation regarding the WGRA report as a useful measure of the 
performance of the U.S. military justice system is that the survey methodology and fairly low 
response rate introduce the possibility for non-response bias. In this context, “non-response bias” 
can be summarized as a statistical distortion that occurs when certain groups are more inclined to 
participate in the survey than other groups in the population.44 Professors David Schlueter and Lisa 
Schenck raise this concern with the WGRA findings in a recent paper by suggesting that a person 
who has experienced sexual assault may be “more likely to complete the lengthy WGRA written 
survey than a person who has not been sexually assaulted, which may inflate the number of sexual 
assault victims.”45 Indeed, a 2017 study of estimated sexual assault prevalence in the Canadian 
military found that “members who had experienced sexual assault may have been more likely to 
respond [to the online survey] than members who had not experienced sexual assault” and that this 
introduced the risk of statistical bias in the survey results.46 
In the context of the WGRA, the report authors do indicate that the OPA uses a “variety of 
methods to gauge potential non-response bias” and “has found no evidence of non-response bias.”47 
However, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such control measures since the report authors 
do not provide details regarding the methods employed. Likewise, it is not clear whether the “variety 
of dimensions” for non-response bias that are evaluated by the report authors include the possibility 
that a person who has experienced sexual assault is more likely to take the time and effort necessary 
to respond to the survey. 
For what it may be worth, my own experience with WGRA surveys (and their predecessors) 
while I was in the military is consistent with the concerns expressed by Professors Schlueter and 
Schenck and that are expressed in the survey related to sexual assault prevalence in the Canadian 
Armed Forces mentioned above. Despite receiving multiple invitations to participate in the survey 
during numerous successive years, not once did I elect to participate in the survey. My own 
 
44 For a useful summary of the statistical concept, see Stephanie Glen, Non Response Bias: Definition, Examples, 
STATISTICSHOWTO.COM (Oct. 11, 2015), https://www.statisticshowto.com/non-response-bias. 
45 David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, A White Paper on National, Military, and College Reports on 
Prosecution of Sexual Assaults and Victims’ Rights at 9 (July 2020), 
https://www.caaflog.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132385649/us_military_v._college_paper__july_21__.pdf. 
46 Kimberley Watkins et al., Military-related Sexual Assault in Canada: A Cross-sectional Survey, 5 CMAJ OPEN 
E496, E501 (2017), https://www.cmajopen.ca/content/cmajo/5/2/E496.full.pdf. 
47 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 322. 
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declination was based on the incorrect perception that I would have nothing substantial to 
contribute to the survey if I participated.  
At the earliest such invitation that I recall, which was for the 2010 version of the survey, it 
had been well over a decade since I had personally experienced sexual assault in the military. Based 
on my own personal circumstances, I was able to cope with that experience fairly well and had long 
since moved on. It was not clear to me that I would have anything worthy of contributing for a 
survey involving sexual assault (among other topics) in the military. This experience – declining to 
participate in the survey based on a misperception that I would have nothing substantial to 
contribute – was prevalent among my friends and coworkers, too, whether or not they expressed 
that they had any personal experience with sexual assault in the past.  
While these reflections are, of course, purely anecdotal, my own recollections regarding the 
WGRA survey support the concerns related to non-response bias that have been expressed 
elsewhere in the literature. Again, this may be a factor that is adequately addressed by the authors of 
the WGRA report, but it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of any control measures since the 
methods are not disclosed, nor are the specific “variety of dimensions” for which the authors 
attempt to control. In any event, the potential that non-response bias may skew the results reflected 
in the WGRA report detracts from the utility of the results as an expression of actual sexual assault 
prevalence and as a gauge of the effectiveness of the U.S. military justice system writ large.  
 
The Way Ahead with WGRA Statistics Situated in the Proper Context 
 
With these three significant limitations in mind, I close by assessing the landscape of the 
current debate regarding military justice reform if the WGRA report is positioned in the proper 
context. Given that the WGRA findings provide only an estimate of reported experiences related to 
sexual assault (among other topics) rather than actual crimes of sexual assault, how useful is the report 
as a gauge of the effectiveness of the U.S. military justice system in responding to allegations of 
sexual assault? In short, the WGRA survey reports are of extremely limited probative value as a 
measure of the effectiveness of the military justice system. This is true regardless of whether 
disposition authority for sexual assault offenses is vested in commanders or military lawyers.  
The value as a measure of the effectiveness of the military justice system in the effort to 
prevent and respond to sexual assault offenses is limited primarily for three reasons. First, the 
reports analyze experiences respondents endorse in answering surveys rather than actual criminal 
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offenses – and, of course, the military justice system is only utilized to respond to the latter. Second, 
even as an analysis of respondents’ endorsements of experiences, the risk of statistical bias examined 
above means the WGRA report does not present a particularly precise estimate. Neither of these 
factors impugns the analysis conducted in the WGRA reports since the authors account for these 
limitations and therefore do not purport to present a precise estimate of actual offenses. 
The third plenary factor that limits the effectiveness of the results of the WGRA report as a 
measure of the military justice system is that a substantial portion of the estimated number of 
endorsed experiences of sexual assault in the military involve conduct that very likely would not be 
referred to a court-martial – whether a commander or judge advocate has that authority. The 
WGRA report notes that 42% of women and 60% of men who endorsed experiencing sexual assault 
in the year preceding the survey identified a “non-penetrative sexual assault as the worst behavior 
experienced.”48  
While disposition authorities – currently commanders – can refer non-penetrative offenses 
such as abusive sexual contact to court-martial, for less serious actual offenses of this variety the 
disposition authority has a number of other disciplinary tools available that can achieve justice. 
These include measures such as non-judicial punishment and an administrative separation (that is, 
terminating the military service of the offender) with a potentially other-than-honorable discharge if 
the appropriate process is followed. The overall prevalence estimate presented in the WGRA report 
includes a statistically significant number of endorsed experiences that would quite likely not be 
referred to court-martial – regardless of who has that authority. 
All told, the WGRA survey reports present valuable insights involving trends related to the 
experiences conveyed by respondents, but the reports provide almost no value as a measure of the 
military justice system. Although it has been suggested that the estimated prevalence provides a close 
approximation of the actual number of sexual assaults and this can be compared to the number of 
reported incidents,49 the limitations analyzed in this essay demonstrate that the WGRA reports do 
not in fact present even a marginally precise estimate of actual offenses. This is completely 
 
48 Id. at 30. 
49 See, e.g., Landon Allison & Cassidey Kavathas, Fact-checking Kirsten Gillibrand on Military Sexual Assaults, 
POLITIFACT (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2021/mar/25/kirsten-gillibrand/fact-checking-
kirsten-gillibrand-military-sexual-a (suggesting that the number of reports of alleged sexual assault actually received 
by the military chain of command is but “one of two measurements the Pentagon uses to count sexual assaults.” The 
authors continue by surmising, “The other is a biennial estimate of sexual assaults, based on survey responses. The 
idea is that some servicemembers who are sexually assaulted will not file a formal complaint, but would still be 
willing to tell a survey taker about it.”). 
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acceptable for the WGRA report since it does not claim to present data regarding actual offenses. 
The authors of the WGRA report correctly observe that the findings simply help “guide our 
knowledge” regarding characteristics of sexual assault in the military.50  
However, using these data as an approximation for actual prevalence or for assessing 
whether commanders are making sound decisions regarding what alleged offenses to send to trial is 
not supportable by the methodology or the data. Because the long-running characterization that the 
U.S. military is beset by an “epidemic of rape” is founded on this fairly consistent estimated 
prevalence of around 20,000 sexual assaults each year,51 lawmakers and the constituents they 
represent must fundamentally reassess what they have come to believe about the actual prevalence 
of sexual assault in the military. The same is true for military members, all the way up the ranks.  
For example, General Mark Milley, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
recently observed, "If we had 20,000 casualties in Afghanistan last year or 20,000 casualties in Iraq, 
we'd be taking some pretty radical actions to correct that.”52 With a current active-duty military DoD 
end strength of just under 1.35 million service members,53 taking 20,000 casualties would mean 
losing about 1.5% of the force in one year. This casualty rate would most assuredly call for “some 
pretty radical actions.” 
Likewise, the current prevailing assessment regarding the effectiveness of the military justice 
system in preventing and responding to sexual assault in the military must be reexamined. To revisit 
Lynn Rosenthal’s assertion, for example, that “twenty thousand service members experience sexual 
assault every year” while “only a tiny fraction of those end up with any kind of action at all in the 
military justice system,”54 there is actually very little connection between the estimated prevalence 
and the performance of the military justice system. 
To develop a more useful sense of the effectiveness of commanders when deciding whether 
to refer an alleged sexual offense to trial, a much more specific study would need to be undertaken 
than the WGRA reports present. Fortunately, several such studies have been conducted. The most 
 
50 2018 WGRA OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 15 at 25. 
51 See, e.g., John M. Donnelly, Lawmakers Near Big Response to Military ‘Rape Epidemic’, ROLL CALL (Feb. 4, 
2021), https://www.rollcall.com/2021/02/04/lawmakers-near-big-response-to-military-rape-epidemic (quoting Don 
Christensen, president of the advocacy group Protect Our Defenders, who reportedly referred to an “epidemic of 
rape” in the military and observed that “[t]here are an estimated 20,500 military men and women sexually assaulted 
in a year, yet barely 100 offenders are convicted”). 
52 Oren Liebermann, Top US General Drops Opposition to Major Policy Changes on Sexual Assault in the Military, 
CNN (May 3, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/03/politics/milley-sexual-assault-military/index.html. 
53 Armed Forces Strength Figures for May 31, 2021, supra note 8. 
54 See Dep’t. Def. Press Briefing, supra note 11. 
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recent such study determined that “there is not a systemic problem with the initial disposition 
authority’s decision either to prefer a penetrative sexual offense charge or to take no action against 
the subject for that offense.”55 This study, published in October 2020 by the Defense Advisory 
Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces, 
analyzed actual casefiles that were initially considered by commanders. The authors of the report 
concluded that “in 94.0% and 98.5% of cases reviewed, respectively, those decisions [by 
commanders] were reasonable.”56  
Whatever the path ahead may be for the ongoing debate regarding commander disposition 
authority and sexual assault in the military,57 those engaged in the discussion must remain cognizant 
of the fact that the central problem they seek to address – the “epidemic of rape and sexual assault” 
in the military – is not in fact supported by the prevalence data that is so often cited in favor of this 
characterization. Likewise, the denominator – 20,000 – for the “tiny fraction” of cases that 
commanders send to trial in no way reflects actual sexual assault offenses. In whatever manner the 
debate plays out, those in a position to make decisions will if nothing else be better informed with 
this essential knowledge. 
 
55 DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND DEFENSE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE 
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57 For a summary of recent developments on the topic, see Jennifer Steinhauer, Pushing Beyond Sex Assault, 
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